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Abstract 
This paper considers the implications of education and environment policy for growth in a model 
where the interactions between health, education, and the environment are taken into account. With respect 
to previous works, in which one of these three dimensions is omitted, we consider their combined effects, 
arriving to novel results in the literature. According to our model, higher taxes and environment spending 
share in total public spending do not affect welfare significantly, but they have an important positive impact 
on human capital and environment quality. Here, a positive relationship between public education spending 
and environment quality emerges as well as between environment maintenance expenditure and human 
capital. At the same time, countries with a high environmental quality should spend less on environment 
maintenance compared to heavily polluted countries. Finally, for countries with advanced abatement 
technologies, the relationship between human capital and environment is positive, which is compatible with 
the environmental Kuznets curve.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The interplay between environment quality and growth has attracted increasing attention on behalf of 
policy makers, economists and citizens alike recently in the advent of serious environmental problems facing 
the world, like climate change, ozone depletion and marine pollution (Tong et al., 2002).   
There are several papers dealing with the relationship between environment quality and economic 
dynamics. One of the first papers similar in spirit with our work is by Gradus-Smulders (1993) who study an 
economy where human capital drives growth and pollution is a side-product of physical capital. They show 
that when environmental care is higher, production is less physical capital intensive and optimal growth is 
constant or higher, depending on whether pollution influences agents' learning ability. Subsequently, 
Hartman-Kwon (2005) in a growth model where human capital is produced cleanly and physical capital may 
be used for pollution control, prove that: a) growth is sustainable; b) in the long run it is optimal for human 
capital to grow more rapidly than physical capital, output and consumption, while pollution declines; c) an 
environmental Kuznets curve emerges; d) a pollution tax or a voucher system can implement Pareto 
efficiency. In a later work, Grimaud-Tournemaine (2007) find that tighter environmental policy can promote 
growth in a model where growth is driven by human capital, firms invest in emission abatement and 
education enhances productivity and enters in preferences. In a review paper, Ricci (2007) mentions that 
environmental regulation can enhance growth if higher environmental quality increases TFP or the efficiency 
of education. Furthermore, expectations of a better environment may enhance savings and growth if 
consumption and environmental quality are complements. Recently, Pautrel in a series of papers (2008, 
2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e) shows that environmental policy is either growth- enhancing or has an 
inverse U-shaped relationship with growth taking into account the detrimental impact of pollution on health 
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and utility. More recently, Varvarigos (2010), in a model where longevity is positively affected by public 
health spending and negatively by pollution, proves that emissions and pollution abatement may affect 
economic dynamics, the likelihood of multiple equilibria and poverty traps. Finally, Mariani et al. (2010) 
show the existence of a positive correlation between longevity and environmental quality and the possibility 
of multiple equilibria in models where growth is driven by physical and human capital.   
Our paper examines the environment-growth relationship in an economy populated by two-period 
lived agents, where human capital is the engine of growth. Regarding the structure of our economy, first, we 
assume that environment and human capital stocks affect health (e.g. WHO, 2002, Valent et. al., 2004), 
which in turn influences the probability of survival from the first to the second period of life. The survival 
probability is a continuous function, unlike Mariani et al (2010) who use a two-step function and other 
papers, which do not incorporate uncertainty (e.g. Hartman-Kwon, 2005, Gradus-Smulders, 1993). Second, 
health affects human capital accumulation, as Van Zon-Muysken (2001), Gradus-Smulders (1993), Weil 
(2007), Aghion et al (2009/2010) suggest. Third, public environment maintenance expenditure boosts 
environment stock accumulation, as e.g. in Varvarigos (2010). Fourth, government education spending 
enhances human capital accumulation similarly to e.g. Glomm-Ravikumar (1992), Osang-Sarkar (2008). 
Fifth, our paper is one of very few papers in the relevant literature, where leisure affects utility directly, 
agents make a leisure-schooling choice and time devoted to education affects human capital accumulation 
unlike e.g. Varvarigos (2010), Pautrel (2009 Ecological Economics). So, our human capital accumulation 
equation is richer than most related papers (e.g. Pautrel, 2008, Grimaud-Tournemaine, 2007). Sixth, 
production causes pollution, which lowers future environment quality, like most related work (e.g. Brock-
Taylor, 2005, Handbook of Economic Growth, Hartman-Kwon, 2005, Mariani et al., 2010, Varvarigos, 
2010). Finally, government taxes income of the old generation every period, since this is the only generation 
which earns income. We investigate the steady-state and solve for the optimal policy under the assumption of 
a benevolent dictator who cares only about the old generation. We do this, because we believe governments 
serve current generations, because the latter are the voters.      
We arrive at interesting conclusions. First, higher taxes and environment spending share in total public 
spending do not affect welfare significantly, but they have an important positive impact on human capital 
and environment quality. Second, there is a positive relationship between public education spending and 
environment quality as well as human capital. Third, there is a positive relationship between environment 
maintenance expenditure and human capital, but a negative relation between environment maintenance 
expenditure and environment stock; that is countries with a high environmental quality should spend less on 
environment maintenance compared to heavily polluted countries. These are novel results in the literature. 
Fourth, for countries with advanced abatement technologies, the relationship between human capital and 
environment is positive, which is compatible with the environmental Kuznets curve. Fifth, taxation depends 
on current levels of environment and human capital stocks.  
Since governments tend to apply myopic policies, i.e. serve just current generations, a way to 
influence such policies, therefore the stocks of human and environmental capital, is through stronger 
preferences for future environment quality. That is, a cultural change could influence the next “Copenhagen 
meeting”. Additionally, “cleaner” production technologies and/or more effective abatement will make it 
optimal for governments to increase environment maintenance expenditure. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the structure of the economy, while in 
section 3 we analyze the general equilibrium. In section 4 we perform the numerical analysis of the model 
and in section 5 we solve for the optimal policy. Finally, in section 6 we conclude the paper and present 
directions for future research.  
 
2. The structure of the economy  
 
Time is discrete and the economy has an infinite-horizon. Every period t = 0, 1,… a new generation of 
individuals is born and they live for two periods. Every generation consists of a [0, 1] continuum of 
homogeneous agents with perfect foresight regarding future variables. The “initial old generation” is 
endowed with a positive stock of human capital and environment quality.
1
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 This assumption refers to the idea that human beings own a minimum stock of natural knowledge that gives them a 
certain probability to survive from one period to the other even when education is absent.   
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As in John and Pecchenino (1994), we assume that individuals born at time t have preferences defined 
over consumption in old age (ct+1) and an index of environmental quality (hereafter, environment) which 
they provide as a bequest to their children (et+1). Additionally, in the first period of life, the agents allocate 
their time between leisure and formal education. The leisure time spent in young age (nt) enters the utility 
function and its marginal utility represents the welfare cost of studying. Agents work only in the second 
period of life. They supply inelastically one unit of labour and consume all their income before they die. 
Formally, individuals born in t maximize the following intertemporal utility: 
 
                                  
       (1) 
 
where 1t  is the probability of survival from the first to the second period of life; ρ is the discount factor; α 
and b are the weights of nt , et+1 relative to ct+1 respectively in the utility function. So, individuals face a 
certain probability to die before reaching adulthood and this affects the allocation of their time between 
leisure and schooling. The probability to survive through the next period depends on the health level of 
individuals when they are young:    
 
                                                         (2) 
 
 
where qt is the health level of an individual born at time t when she is young and B>0 reflects factors 
affecting survival probability except health. From (2) we have that marginal returns to health in terms of the 
probability to survive are decreasing in health, that is, increasing the health level contributes more to the 
survival of  people who have low levels of health. So, health enters the utility function, since it allows for 
future consumption. The level of health depends on environmental quality and parental human capital 
according to a standard Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
                                                              (3) 
                                   
where ht and et are the stocks of human capital and environment already accumulated at time t, while z and κ 
are the corresponding factor shares. Equation (3) captures the idea that the higher the environment quality as 
well as the education of parents (through child care), the better the health status of agents and the higher the 
individual probability of survival till adulthood. 
We assume that the initial old generation is endowed with a positive stock of human capital and 
environment, so this probability will be always positive and less than 1.   
For simplicity, we assume that output is produced with a one-to-one technology where human capital 
is the only input: yt = ht. This means that the human capital accumulation function also describes the way in 
which output is produced. 
The quality of environment at time t+1, et+1, is a function of the previous stock, et, environment 
maintenance expenditure at t, mt, and production, ht, which causes pollution. Environment evolves according 
to the following law of motion: 
 
                                           (4) 
 
where, σ represents the productivity of maintenance expenditure in the environment accumulation 
function, while δ and β capture the environmental depreciation due to natural and human activities 
respectively.   
The stock of human capital at time t+1 depends on human capital at t, health at t, qt, public education 
spending at t, gt, and time devoted to education at t, 1- nt: 
 
                          (5) 
 
Parameter A is an index of exogenous technological progress, while parameters χ, υ, λ and μ are the 
factor shares of our Cobb-Douglas production function. Given (3), we have that γ= κυ and θ= zχ.  
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Since we assumed that individuals consume all their income during the second period of life, the only 
bequest from parents to children is environmental quality. After-tax income (human capital) equals 
consumption as follows: 
 
                                                      (6) 
 
where τ is the tax rate, which is exogenous for the moment. 
Government taxes human capital (income) of the old generation in period t. Assuming that all public 
spending is devoted to environment and education and the budget is balanced, we can write the government’s 
budget constraints and complete the model as follows: 
 
                                                            (7) 
 
Equation (7) states that environment maintenance expenditure at t is a fraction, ν, of total government 
revenues at the same date, τht. Accordingly, education expenditure will be a fraction, 1- ν, of government 
revenues: 
 
                                                        (8)  
 
Using this framework, in the next sections we study the steady-state equilibrium of the model by, 
initially, considering the government policy as exogenous and then endogenizing government decisions.
2
  
 
3. General equilibrium  
 
Events take place in two stages. First, government chooses the tax rate and the allocation of the 
associated revenues among the two types of policy. Second, private agents choose consumption, 
environment bequests for their children and leisure (therefore time devoted to education) taking economic 
policy as given. Since individuals are rational, have perfect foresight, we can solve the maximization 
problem by backward induction, that is, we substitute ct+1 and et+1 using (6) and (4) respectively in the 
objective function (1) to get: 
 
         (9) 
 
From (2), (3), (5), (7) and (8), we have:  
 
   (10) 
 
Taking the derivative of (10) w.r.t. nt we can get the following first-order condition: 
 
                                                 (11) 
 
that is, 
                                                   
(12) 
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 We are aware that taxation is not exogenous, but we believe that this temporary assumption will be useful to better 
understand the mechanics of the model. 
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When 0 t
z
t eh , we have that 1
* tn . This means that - given our initial, positive values of h and 
e - if µ and ρ are positive, we always get an interior solution for optimal leisure time. 
Since the probability to survive is positively related to qt, the optimal leisure time, when an individual 
is young, negatively depends on her health level. In fact, an individual with a low probability to survive will 
not invest much time to accumulate human capital in order to increase her future consumption; she will 
instead prefer to enjoy leisure. Moreover, Equation (12) shows the intergenerational link: the decision to 
invest in education strongly depends on the stocks of human capital and environment already accumulated by 
previous generations.  
Given (7), (12), we can rewrite the laws of motion of environment and human capital as follows: 
 
                                     (13) 
 
                         
(14) 
 
 
 
The steady-state levels of environment quality and human capital will be 
 
                                                 (15) 
 
            
(16) 
 
 
 
For the rest of the paper, we will assume   , that is, the marginal effect of government 
expenditure on environmental policy overcomes the pollution effect, which we call the “we can clean” 
hypothesis. Consequently, the steady-state level of environmental quality is increasing in the steady-state 
level of human capital. By looking at the EKC (Environmental Kuznets Curve) literature, this conclusion 
seems to be consistent only with some developed countries that experienced a positive relationship between 
income and environmental quality. However, this literature is far from being exhaustive and considers only 
some specific indicators of pollution. What is new, here, compared with most literature on human capital, is 
that the latter is affected by health; this implies that a comprehensive set of pollution indicators, which 
influence learning through health, should be used in order to test this result. In light of that, empirical work 
should correct output measures incorporating health and schooling indicators.  
Since Equation (16) cannot be solved in an algebraic way, we reformulate it as follows: 
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Function f(.) represents the fraction of time devoted to education by individuals. At least one 
equilibrium always exists in our model: F(0) = 0. Since both functions are continuous and f(.) converges to a 
finite value as h goes to infinity whereas function g(.) goes to infinity, in order to have a non trivial solution, 
function F(.) must be positive for some positive values of h. It is easy to see that the behavior of the f(.) and 
g(.) functions depends on the nature of returns to scale in the production of health and human capital. By 
assuming   , if 01    we will have 0)(' hf  and 0)(' hg . Concerning the concavity 
of these two functions we have: 
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Proposition 1: If returns to scale in both health and education are decreasing: i) a positive steady-state 
level of human capital always exists and it is unique; ii) the steady-state equilibrium is stable. 
Proof:  
i) Since F(0) = 0 and F() = -, for continuity is sufficient to show that F(h) is positive for some 
values of h. This can be done by taking the first derivative of F(.): )(')(')(' hghfhF  . It is easy to see 
that, given our assumptions on the returns to scale, f’(h) goes to infinity as h goes to zero, whereas g’(h) goes 
to zero. This means that, for values of h small enough function F(.) assumes positive values. 
Moreover, given the previous results on the shape of f(h) and g(h), we know that the equilibrium is 
unique. 
ii) For stability we must rewrite (16) as follows: 
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In a left neighborhood of the steady-state equilibrium the following condition must hold: 
)()( hghf   
 
From (i) we know that this is true for our non trivial equilibrium.        (Q.E.D.) 
 
Corollary 1: Proposition 1, together with Equation (15), implies that the quality of environment will 
be positive in the stationary equilibrium. 
tz
z
t h
ehaBa
aehB
hAhh 

























)(
)(
1)1(
)(
0
)(
)(
1)1(
)(













tz
z
h
ehaBa
aehB
hAh





















1
)1(
)()(
)(
1



















hAh
h
ehaBa
aehB t
z
z
7 
 
 
Figure 1 shows the case in which returns to scale are decreasing in both health and human capital 
sectors. In particular, if returns to scale in the health sector are decreasing, the f(.) function is concave, while 
decreasing returns to scale in the education sector lead to a convex g(.) function. The steady-state level of 
human capital  h  will be unique. 
 
 
Figure 1: Unique steady-state equilibrium 
 
Concerning the stability of the steady-state, assume to start from an initial point such as ht: f(ht)>g(ht), 
then we will have F(ht)>0 and the human capital stock will move towards the steady-state value. When ht is 
smaller than the steady-state value, agents devote a larger fraction of time to human capital accumulation 
than the fraction would be necessary in order to have the steady-state value at ht. This leads to an increase in 
the levels of human capital and environment quality that improves individuals’ health. On the other hand, 
since the probability to survive is a concave function of the health level, the incentives to accumulate further 
human capital will decrease till the steady-state level.  
 
Proposition 2: If returns to scale in the health sector are increasing, equilibrium multiplicity can arise. 
Proof: Since function g(.) is always convex or concave according to parameter values, multiple 
equilibria are possible only if function f(.) changes its concavity after a certain value of h. From the study of 
its second derivative we have seen that this is true, since: 
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So, multiple equilibria arise. In other words, a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to have multiple 
equilibria is the presence of increasing returns to scale in the health sector.   (Q.E.D.) 
 
Figure 2 shows the case in which returns to scale are increasing in the health sector. Here three 
equilibria arise and two of them (0 and hH) are stable because of the values of f(h) with respect to g(h) in a 
neighborhood of the steady-state equilibria. 
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Figure 2: The case of multiple equilibria 
 
In the next section, we will see that Proposition 1 is verified under plausible values of our parameters. 
However, before performing the numerical analysis, in Table 1 we report the effects of parameters’ changes 
on the steady-state level of human capital. These results are obtained by studying the behavior of g(h) and 
f(h) when   . Through Equation (15), we can also infer the effects on environment. 
 
Table 1: The impact of parameters on human capital 
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For example, higher B implies lower probability of survival for any health level. For this reason B has 
a negative effect on human capital accumulation. Parameter α captures the relative preference for leisure 
time in young age, thus a higher α lowers human capital stock. The opposite happens for ρ; individuals with 
stronger preferences for future consumption and environment will invest more in human capital 
accumulation. Environmental depreciation parameters, δ and β, negatively affect the environmental stock 
and consequently the accumulation of human capital. On the contrary, σ positively influences the 
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environmental stock and therefore human capital. Finally, technological progress A directly affects the 
accumulation of h, by increasing the productivity of all factors.  
Under the “we can clean” hypothesis, the relationship between τ and steady-state human capital is 
always positive. Finally, factor shares and government variables have an ambiguous impact on the steady-
state level of human capital. For this reason, we will study their effects through a numerical analysis.  
 
4. Numerical Analysis 
 
4.1 Parameter choices 
Here, we want to check if for reasonable parameter values, a stable steady-state exists. The parameter 
values were chosen based among others on Pautrel (2009), Gutierez (2008), Jouvet et al. (2007), Antoci-
Sodini (2009), Finlay (2006), Benos (2010). 
 
 
Table 2: Parameters used in the numerical analysis 
PARAMETERS BENCHMARK 
VALUES 
RANGE 
Β 1 1-3 
ρ 0.24 0.2-0.3 
β 0.01 0.003-0.015 
δ 0.004 0.002-0.006 
z 0.25 0.1-0.5 
κ 0.1* 0.1-0.5 
Α 1 Free range 
a 0.42 0.08-0.58 
b 0.25 0.08-0.58 
θ 0.45 0.3-0.7 
μ 0.1  0.1 (CRS or DRS) 
σ 0.5 0.25-0.75 
λ 0.2 0.02-0.4 
ν 0.5 - 
τ 0.3 - 
* corrected for the specification of πt+1 
 
4.2 Steady-state 
By using the benchmark values in Table 2, Figures 3, 4 and 5 show that positive steady-state values of 
human capital, environment quality and leisure time exist under plausible values of parameters. The steady-
state levels are 0h , 0e , 0q  and 717679.0h , 6623.11e , 17669.1q . In particular, the 
highest equilibrium is the non trivial equilibrium considered in Proposition 1. 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
 
Figure 3: h(t+1)-h(t) 
 
Figure 3 implies that the steady-state level of human capital is stable.
3
  
 
                                                 
3
 The eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix confirm the stability result proved in Proposition 1.  
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Figure 4: Environment quality as a function of h  
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Figure 5: Optimal leisure time in the steady-state equilibrium 
 
 
 
Finally, Figure 6 represents the health function. 
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Figure 6: q(h) 
 
By construction, the health function is concave with respect to human capital, which means that 
human capital investments increase health status, but marginal returns are decreasing.  
 
4.3 Ambiguous parameters 
Now, we want to see how ambiguous parameters {κ, γ, ν, z, µ, θ, λ, τ} influence the steady-state level 
of human capital. Below, blue functions correspond to the benchmark case (see Figure 3), while red 
functions correspond to the augmented parameter case.
4
  
 
                                                 
4
 Here, each parameter has been increased by a fraction that allows for a clear graphical presentation. 
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Δκ=+0.05                                                                  Γγ=+0.01 
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
h
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
h t 1 h t
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
h
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0.01
0.01
0.02
h t 1 h t
 
Γν=+0.05                                                                    Γz=+0.10 
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h
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0.02
h t 1 h t
 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
h
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
h t 1 h t
 
Γµ=+0.01                                                                     Γθ=+0.05 
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Δλ =+0.01                                                                    Δτ =+0.01 
As we can see, parameters linked to environment accumulation, κ, γ and ν, have positive effects on the 
steady state level of human capital, while parameters linked to human capital accumulation, z, µ, θ and λ, 
have negative effects on steady-state human capital. These parameters enter the human capital accumulation 
function as factor shares other than the environment share and their negative effects essentially depend on 
the fact that the steady-state level of human capital is less than 1.  
In order to better understand this fact, we take a variation of the tax rate such that the new steady-state 
level of human capital is higher than 1 and, at the same time, we assume for instance a positive variation of 
z. The figure below shows that, now, z increases h . 
 
12 
 
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
h
0.02
0.02
0.04
h t 1 h t
 
Figure 7:Γτ =+0.05 and Γz=+0.05 
 
The above implies that taxes generate revenues enhancing human capital and environmental quality 
accumulation, and, through this channel, imply a positive role for factor shares. In the next section, we 
remove the hypothesis of exogenous policy in order to see if and when a positive role for government exists. 
  
5. Optimal Policy 
 
5.1 Necessary conditions  
We believe that the best way to study the behavior of policy makers when we consider environmental 
and educational policies is to take into account the fact that the time horizon of governments is not infinite as 
often assumed in standard OLG models. On the contrary, governments aim to serve current generations, 
because the latter are the voters. The simplest way to model this consideration is by analyzing the case of a 
benevolent dictator that pleases the current generations.
5
 That is, government acts as a benevolent 
Stackelberg leader vis-à-vis the private sector. So, the optimal policy a government implements maximizes 
the utility function (10) given agents’ behaviour. In general, we can define a policy as a set of independent 
policy instruments {τ, ν}.  
The F.O.C.s w.r.t. n, τ and ν for the government’s problem are:  
 
                                                  (18) 
 
 
                         (19) 
 
 
                                (20) 
 
 
 
This leads to the following relations: 
                                                       (21) 
 
                                          (22) 
 
 
                                         (23) 
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 In a representative agent approach, our agent can be thought as the median voter. 
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We have an interior solution for τ and ν if 0)()1(   tt he , that is, if    or if 
t
t
e
h
but 






1
.  
Notice that Equation (21) coincides with Equation (12) once we substitute πt+1 with its expression, 
while Equations (22) and (23) define the optimal policy },{ ** tt   at time t. These equations show an 
important property of optimal taxation: it depends on the current stocks of environment and human capital. 
Therefore, only in the steady-state equilibrium taxes as well as government spending on environment and 
education remain constant. Along the convergence path, we can study the dynamics of the optimal policy 
},{ ** tt  . A convenient way to perform this analysis is reducing the order of the dynamic system by 
considering the optimal environment maintenance expenditure instead of the two instruments separately. 
After having briefly examined the role of h and e on τ and ν, in the last section we will see that the optimal 
environment maintenance expenditure is increasing in h. In the next section, before examining the effects of 
parameters’ changes on the optimal policy, we repeat our numerical example for the endogenous policy case 
in order to see how the steady-state is affected by public policies. 
 
5.2 Steady-state 
By implementing the numerical analysis using the same parameter values as before (see Table 2), we 
obtain the following results: 
 
Benchmark case Optimal policy 
τ=0.3 τ=0.184013 
ν=0.5 ν=0.113122 
n=0.970035 n=0.999944 
h= 0.717679
 
h=4.99903 10
-9 
e=11.6623
 
e=5.09893 10
-10 
Exponent U=0.932186 Exponent U=0.932863 
 
If we compare the optimal policy with a non-optimal policy (characterized by higher levels of τ and ν) 
we can see that utility is 99.93% of the maximum utility, while the stocks of human capital and environment 
are notably higher with non-optimal policy.
6
 Moreover, even leisure time does not change dramatically.  
Public investments in education and environment can notably increase the stocks of human capital, 
environment and health by slightly reducing individuals’ utility. 
 
5.3 Parameters and optimal policy 
In this section, we study how parameters influence the optimal policy. In order to investigate this 
question we must consider that τ influences our utility function through two channels:  
 
1) Direct channel: τ directly reduces disposable income and consumption.  
2) Indirect channel: τ has a positive effect on environment and human capital through government 
spending.  
 
Even if the direct effect of ν on human capital is negative, since the share of government spending in 
environment directly reduces human capital accumulation, this relation is not simple. This is so, because ν 
increases environment stock which enters the utility function and the production of future human capital 
through environment spending.  
The parameters that influence τ and ν are five and they can be divided into three groups: 
 
i)  Preference parameter (b) 
                                                 
6 The optimal policy configuration leads to a stable node with oscillatory convergence, since one eigenvalue is positive 
(0.952764) and the other is negative (-0.140411), but both are less than 1. 
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When pollution is not too strong, 0)()1(   tt he , a higher b, increases τ and ν.
7
 In other 
words, societies with a strong preference for environmental quality relative to consumption will be 
characterized by higher taxes and expenditure on environment.  
 
ii)  Elasticity of human capital w.r.t. schooling expenditure (λ) 
At the same time, if 0)()1(   tt he , λ increases τ. When public expenditure is more 
effective in the educational sector, the society will invest more in schooling in order to enjoy higher levels of 
income, consumption and environment.  
Τhe impact of λ on ν will depend on the magnitude of b. If b is large enough, higher λ, lowers ν. That 
is, a society with strong preferences for environment, when investment in schooling becomes more efficient, 
will prefer improve environment quality through human capital accumulation (reducing ν) instead of 
investing directly in environment. 
 
iii) Environmental parameters (σ, δ, β) 
When the remaining environment stock after natural depreciation is greater than human pollution, 
 tt he  )1( , the more effective is environment maintenance expenditure, the higher τ and ν will be. 
This is the same mechanism behind the role of λ with respect to schooling.  
Finally, δ and β are always positively related to τ and ν. That is, higher environmental depreciation 
will require higher levels of public intervention in order to avoid environment destruction. 
 
5.4 Government spending 
From Table 1, we know that an increase in the policy instruments {τ, ν} leads to an increase in h and 
e. The latter effect implies a higher natural depreciation rate for environment and this causes a 
counterbalancing mechanism on optimal policy. That is, there is a positive relationship between h and the 
policy instruments and a negative relationship between e and the same instruments. Although, this analysis is 
relevant, in terms of empirical investigation it is more suitable to study the effects of human capital and 
environment quality variations on government spending.  
Therefore, here, we discuss how parameters influence the optimal public spending in environment and 
education. Formally, the public spending on environment is mt=νtτtht: 
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Whereas, public spending on education is gt=(1-νt )τtht: 
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The optimal environment maintenance expenditure is increasing in h and decreasing in e. The second 
effect comes from the fact that both τ and ν decrease when environmental quality increase.  
When the productivity of maintenance expenditure overcomes the pollution effect, the higher the stock 
of human capital, the higher the educational spending. So, if economic growth is not too polluting, 
government must invest in the education sector. 
Finally, since environment maintenance expenditure is decreasing in the environmental stock, when 
this stock increases, a government will substitute part of the environmental spending with educational 
spending. 
The role of other parameters is summarized in Table 3, and they simply involve the combined effects 
of parameters’ changes already discussed in the previous section.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Notice that this condition also implies an interior solution for τ and ν. 
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Table 3: Qualitative effects of parameters’ changes on public spending 
Parameter Effect on mt Effect on gt Condition 
b + - 0)()1(   tt he  
λ - + 0)()1(   tt he  
σ + - 0)1(  tt he   
δ + - Always 
β + - Always 
 
Briefly, we can say that the relative preference for future environmental quality, b, has a positive 
impact on environmental spending and consequently a negative impact on educational spending. The optimal 
spending in schooling increases when λ increases. This is due to the fact that the higher λ, the higher the 
productivity of public expenditure on education. Finally, concerning environmental parameters, when 
depreciation parameters (δ and β) are higher, government spending on environment maintenance must be 
higher; the role of σ, i.e. government productivity in environment maintenance, depends on the size of 
pollution (if pollution is not too high, it is optimal to increase the environmental spending when σ is higher). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the implications of education and environment policies for the dynamics of the 
economy when the interactions between health, education, and the environment are taken into account in a 
two-period overlapping generations model.   The first characteristic of the model concerns environment and 
human capital stocks, which affect health. Heath status influences the probability of survival from the first to 
the second period of life and human capital accumulation, therefore future consumption. The second feature 
is production, which causes pollution reducing future environment quality. The third attribute is public 
environment maintenance expenditure that boosts environment stock accumulation. Finally, there is 
government education spending, which enhances human capital accumulation and future consumption. The 
above constitute different channels through which agents’ welfare is affected. Additionally, government 
revenues come from income taxation of the old generation every period. We study the steady-state and solve 
for the optimal policy under the assumption of a benevolent dictator who cares about the old generation 
every period.      
We derive several interesting conclusions. First, for countries with advanced abatement technologies, 
the relationship between human capital and environment is positive. Second, variations in fiscal policy do 
not affect welfare significantly, but they have an important impact on the stocks of human capital and 
environment quality. Third, taxation depends on the levels of environment and human capital stocks. Fourth, 
there is a positive relationship between environment maintenance expenditure and human capital, but a 
negative relationship between environment maintenance expenditure and environment stock; that is countries 
with a high environmental quality should spend less on environment maintenance compared to heavily 
polluted countries. Fifth, there is a positive relationship between public education spending and environment 
quality as well as human capital. 
Since governments tend to apply myopic policies, i.e. serve just current generations, the best way to 
influence such policies, therefore the stocks of human and environmental capital, is through an increase in b. 
That is, a cultural change, reflected greener preferences for future environment, could influence the next 
“Copenhagen meeting”. Additionally, “cleaner” production technologies and/or more effective abatement 
will make it optimal for governments to increase environment maintenance expenditure.    
There are various extensions of this work. First, we could endogenize the preference parameters, e.g. 
assuming that preferences for future environmental quality depend on current environment stock. Second, we 
might introduce public health spending in the health production function. Third, agent heterogeneity might 
be introduced, so that an mechanism of fiscal policy determination in a political economy setting is 
necessary. These are left for future work. 
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